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ABSTRACT: A warrant may be grounded in personal testimony, technical method, or public consensus. 
The justified choice of a field, in authorizing the warrant and providing further extension of support 
constitutes a legitimation inference. Complex cases evolve when there are a surplus of good reasons as 
potential support for a claim, and a choice must be made either to select a single ground for the claim or to 
advance independently valid reasons, differentially grounded, as support. Complex cases enter the realm of 
controversy when not all relevant grounds offer the same degree of support or point in the same direction, 
and a choice to select some grounds and discard others must be justified. The justification of the selection 
of grounds constitutes a legitimation warrant—a missing element of the Toulmin model. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Toulmin model (1958, 2003) opened the door to the recovery of practical reason, the 
development of informal logic, and the advances of critical thinking into the realms of the 
everyday uses of argument. An alternative to positivistic reasoning, the model provided a 
basic outline that called attention to the ordinary communicative practices that lend 
support to claims for a reason. This intuitive idea of argumentation is at the basis of 
Habermas’s own notion of the ‘form of argumentation’ where: ‘We try to support a claim 
with good grounds or reasons; the quality of the reasons and their relevance can be called 
into question by the other side; we meet objections and are in some cases forced to 
modify our original positions’ (1981, p. 31). Thus, Habermas follows Toulmin into more 
complex observations, reaffirming the distinctions between the general schema of 
reasoning which is more or less field invariant and the much more elaborate ‘field-
dependent rules of argumentation which are constitutive for the language games or life-
orders of law, medicine, science, politics, art criticism, business enterprise, sport, and so 
on’ (pp. 31-32). To appreciate an argument, then, it is necessary to understand the sort of 
enterprise ‘that is supposed to be advanced through argumentation,’ and to appreciate the 
enterprise, one follows the rules of thumb of argument general to all practical 
engagements and special to the authorized moves and certified standards of a field. 
 The fields of argument explored by Toulmin, Rieke and Janik include science, 
law, management, art criticism, and ethics (1979, pp. 203-338). The fields are said to 
differ along ‘varied’ constellations of complex procedures. The categories for assessing 
the requirements of argument for fields include: (l) degrees of formality ranging from 
informal turn taking to ritual advocacy, (2) degrees of precision ranging from 
mathematical exactitude to more common ball park estimates, (3) alternative 
requirements for completion or resolution that range from mutual agreement producing 
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consensus to impartial judgment effecting a verdict, (4) diverse goals that are linked to 
‘what is at stake within the forum involved’ (p. 198). In this last respect, the goals of 
argument will reflect the ‘general purposes’ and ‘practical demands’ placed upon 
argument by the practices of a field and the objectives of the interlocutors. It is at this 
juncture that Habermas raises an objection, namely that Toulmin ‘doesn’t draw the proper 
lines between accidental institutional differentiations of argumentation, on the one hand, 
and the forms of argumentation determined by internal structure on the other’ (35). In 
other words, the categories of formality, precision, resolution mode, and purpose are 
insufficient descriptors to differentiate between those ‘validity claims’ (assertions of the 
worthiness of an argument to be trusted) that are grounded in routines of practices and 
those that are core to sustaining the integrity of an institution or form of life. At this point, 
Habermas leaves field theory behind and introduces his own well-known theory that 
differentiates argumentation into theoretical, practical, aesthetic, therapeutic, and 
explicative discourse and critique (1981, p. 23). The advantage of Habermas’s system is 
that it properly weights the validity and proof requirements of each form of 
argumentation. 
 The purpose of this paper is to extend the original Toulmin model, with its 
intuitive focus on practice, and its tantalizing promise to find grounds for practical 
reasoning in the warrant-using and warrant establishing work of reasoning authorized by 
the forms and practices of reasoning within fields. I will argue, contra Habermas, that 
argumentation is best served by repairing rather than abandoning Toulmin’s field 
grounded reasoning. The major repair I offer is the addition of ‘legitimation inferences,’ 
that is. justifications of the selection of backing to support a given argument. I will 
endeavor to show how the addition of such a component permits analysis of complex 
cases where grounds may or may not point unequivocally in a single direction. Finally, 
the modern predicament between practical and technical reasoning will be explored 
around the issue of risk in order to illustrate the uses of the repaired Toulmin model in 
exploring contemporary controversy. In the end, the Toulmin model repaired to take into 
account legitimation inferences may help answer Habermas’s objection that Toulmin’s 
field analysis cannot differentiate between essential and accidental features of a field in 
authorizing a warrant. 
 
1. LEGITIMATION INFERENCES 
 
The Toulmin model is missing a critical component: a legitimation warrant. Unnoticed by 
any of its many interpreters, readers and critics, Toulmin is able to convincingly make the 
case that the selection of grounds for establishing a warrant or support is a natural 
connection between argument and context (1958, 103). Indeed, in Toulmin, Janik and 
Rieke, the choice of the grounds for an argument is circularly defined because an 
argument and its purpose are the same thing: legal reasoning contextualizes legal 
argument, the purpose of ethical argument is an ethical decision, and so forth (1979). The 
problem with this notion is that it begs the question as to why any specific argued-claim 
is legitimately appropriate, judicable, proper, or even relevant to a given field. Further, 
since practitioners can borrow standards analogically from another field, or supplement 
the reasoning of one field with the arguments of another (presumption moves from the 
law to science in setting proof standards), the establishment of a claim within the ambit of 
G. THOMAS GOODNIGHT 158 
a field does not always establish what standards of argumentation offer proper 
certification. The justification of a decision to ground a particular argument in a field I 
have called elsewhere a ‘legitimation inference’ (1991). 
 The choice of backing to certify the authority of a warrant requires a special kind 
of inference. Like any other part of the model, the choice of grounding is criticizable; yet, 
the selection of backing is not another item of support, a warrant in itself, a reservation, 
qualifier, or claim. When called upon to justify the crucial choice to develop an argument 
out of a certain interpretation of the authority, relevance, and acceptability of a field, an 
interlocutor is required to show sufficient and necessary reasons for the selection of that 
field—that is to legitimate the assumed or explicit connection. In a warrant-using 
argument, legitimation inferences impart sufficient reasons for the selection of a field to 
ground and develop support, warrants, qualifiers and reservations. In a warrant-
establishing argument, legitimation is a complicated process that balances competing 
choices among fields in the interests of rendering an overall judgment that the 
connections among grounding and backing, while somewhat novel, are none the less 
reasonable. 
 Typically, the legitimation inferences are left in the background. There are 
different reasons for this, depending upon whether a ‘field’ is constellated as informal 
practices of communicative reasoning, professional decision-making, or political 
advocacy. In everyday argumentation, we disagree with one another without having 
recourse to either an etiquette coach or a rule book, because it is appropriate to ground 
our discussion in the informal conventions of conversation and common opinion. In a 
court of law, the formidable symbolism, rituals, trained advocates and justices of the 
forum itself all collaborate to put on a trial where reasons tend toward questions of 
justice. Likewise in other forums, from science to religion, the rules of reasoning appear 
as immanent within a situated discourse, and the situation a product of the practices, 
procedures, and issues of the interlocutors. Finally, in politics, the nature of a deliberation 
grounds discussion in questions of power and expediency by virtue of the time toward 
which decisions are tending to come to a vote or a head. In other words, the social rules, 
institutional fora, and eventfulness of argument offer cues to the field from which reasons 
should be developed and from which standards should be borrowed to inform tests of 
reasoning or the outcomes of judgment. The personal, technical, and public fields within 
which the same (or similar) claims may be grounded suggest that the deliberative 
exigencies of situated argument are typically enmeshed in complex case making. The 
following section distinguishes complex cases that evolve from warrant-using 
argumentation, and those that typically evolve warrant-establishing reasons. 
 
2. THE COMPLEX CASE 
 
A complex case is a situated argument where the settlement of a disagreement depends 
upon the resolution of multiple points of disagreement. This section divides complex 
cases into two types. In Type I complex cases the process of reasoning is well established 
and shaped into coherent case-making. Such cases equate the procedure of arguing with 
the essential nature of the enterprise and reflect warrant-using strategies. Type II complex 
cases are those that cobble together justifications for assembling a complex set of 
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reasons, drawn from diverse fields, to support deliberative reasoning. These cases do not 
rest on any inherent equation of form and purpose, snd often give rise to novelty. 
 
2.1 Type 1 Complex Cases 
 
Classical rhetoric defines the complex case in terms of stasis theory. Questions of fact are 
deployed around a contested conjectural stasis. Questions of definition are procedurally 
argued through a definitional stasis. Questions of the justice or expediency of the act are 
argued through a qualitative stasis. And questions of jurisdiction fall under a translative 
stasis (Stasis, 2005). In the classical paradigm, the levels of disputation distribute the 
burden of proof, so that to affirm the guilt of an accused a prosecution needs to establish 
the preponderance of evidence at all levels, while the defense needs only to successfully 
wage dispute on one. As is well known, should the facts, definition, quality, or place not 
be successfully established, a case cannot be made; on the other hand, should all of these 
claims be put in order, then the force of reason places a demand for a ruling by a judge 
and a call to render a verdict by the jury. Indeed, in discussion prior to trial, a judge may 
inquire of potential jurors as to whether they are capable of making decisions upon 
weighted evidence and of following basic rules of rational conduct presupposed by the 
jurisprudential model of argument. Such a model offers a complex case insofar as 
multiple issues are potentially in play any time the prospect of a legal dispute arises; 
participants in the trial are trained to see in the particular case a field of potential 
arguments weighted and categorized along the lines of potential issues for an overall 
contest between positions; and a mode of coming to terms with the diverse issues is 
invested in a procedure that makes sense on its face. 
 The complex case constituted by forensic stasis is an exception to, rather than a 
paradigm of, everyday argumentation, where decisions of choice and expediency, means 
and ends, risks and outcomes prevail. In every situation where probable argument is in 
play, there is no assurances that (l) there will be a finite number of levels at which 
arguments may statiate, (2) that all engaged in a dispute will agree upon criteria of 
relevance to discern what issues need to be resolved, or even discussed, to properly 
resolve an issue, and (3) that, even should there be an agreement as to relevance, the 
claims involved will bind together in such a neat way as to distribute the burdens of 
proof, determine sides of an argument, and provide a coherent route to adjudication. Nor 
is it even the case that a normative model of deliberation that prescribes levels of stases 
for rendering sound, practical judgments will get the advocates closer to a resolution. 
 In practical argumentation, models have focused on evolving various schemes that 
appear as a fitting counterpart to forensic stasis. One common model is the ill-solution 
paradigm. In making a choice about medical care, one needs to know: if there is an 
illness, how serious it is, what the cause of the illness is (to discover if there are any 
incidental changes that would eliminate the problem), the effectiveness of a cure, and 
whether side-effects would do more harm than the solution good. This complex case is 
like forensic stasis insofar as it offers a coherent, reasonable model of argument that aims 
at a decision by distributing the burden of proof. Just as in forensics, if there is any one of 
the levels of the claims cannot be established, there is no reason to go forward with a 
positive judgment. 
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The difference that is lurking here is that, whereas the question of justice is 
constitutive of reaching a legal decision, the complex case underwriting public 
deliberation is analogical. In Habermas’s terms with which we began, the illness-cure 
model is an accident or variation on deliberative reasoning, whereas forensic stases are 
constitutive of justice. Indeed, the medical model is not necessarily appropriate to 
political activity, and itself rests on the unexamined bias at the bottom of Western 
medicine as a field: ‘do no harm.’ One can imagine a prudential model of complex case-
making that would see government as an initiator of action, with a duty to search out and 
mitigate social problems, where outcomes were in the interests of compensation for past 
wrongs, present inequities, or future legitimacy—rather than merely move to eliminate a 
particular problem when it makes us uncomfortable enough to be seen as an ‘ill.’ In other 
words, the model of deliberation—the narrative within which case-construction is 
articulated—is not a necessary part of deliberative argument, but only a preference to 
frame a context in a particular way in the service of an overall view of how deliberation 
best proceeds for citizens. 
 
2.2 Type II complex cases 
 
In a pluralistic society, deliberation is complicated because the contexts within which 
arguments are made are not obvious, authoritative, or relevant to all who have a right to a 
say in a deliberation. Type II complex cases typically engage what Toulmin calls 
‘warrant-establishing’ arguments. In such cases, it is not enough to determine the likely 
truth or falsity of a well-established series of claims that regulate the production of proof 
and inference bearing upon a claim. The act of placing a claim within a given field 
requires assembling a case where more than one ground that must be addressed. The 
relative weighting of different grounds in an overall decision makes for quite complex 
deliberative argument, indeed. If complexity offers less security in linking argument to 
grounds, it also offers the potential benefit of forming a more robust consensus--more on 
this later. 
 At this point, I would like to enter a simple example to illustrate the use of 
legitimation inferences in an instance of complex case-making. 
Suppose that you are at the pharmacy and are evaluating the reasons that go into a 
decision to take a product Nexium, to fight ‘acid reflux disease.’ At a personal level, you 
have what seems like an upset stomach, hoping that the pain signals digestion issues with 
‘something you ate,’ (+l) but aware that there are worse maladies that afflict others in 
your family (-1). At another level, you are aware of the chemistry of traditional remedies 
for gas (+l), but also interested in the ability of research to provide more effective ‘relief’ 
(-1). At a third level, you have heard a congressional investigation condemn ‘direct to 
market advertising’ (-1) as preying upon the gullible but you are also aware that the FDA 
regulates efficacy (+1). Do you buy ‘Nexium’ or not? How do the arguments ‘add up’ in 
deliberating a reasonable decision? 
 A complex case could be rendered by simply adding and subtracting positive and 
negative reasons, and a reasonable purchase could be defined by the preponderance of 
affirmative or negative evidence. Probability theory would render calculations somewhat 
more complex should the degree of confidence be measured in the strength of an 
affirmative or negative judgment, but the principle of determining the outcome would be 
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relatively the same. Indeed, should all the reasons for or against a claim be vectored in 
the same direction, then a decision is rendered transparent: it would not make sense to 
ignore the conclusion. If all the reasons favored Nexium or all the reasons were opposed 
to the decision, then further deliberation is not necessary. 
Deliberation is never in principle a closed matter, however, and the search for 
disconfirming or countervailing reasons may continue. In the above example, one might 
introduce questions of price and availability of resources at the end of an evening; so a 
lack of available cash might settle the argument. A consensus emerges, however, when 
all claims at the different levels of argumentation independently support a central claim. 
Purchasing Nexium is a good idea because of personal experience, technical information, 
systemic trust, and financial availability. What happens, however, when the field of 
argument relevant to a reasoned decision fails to become transparent? 
 A genuinely complex case arises where reasons point in multiple, relevant, 
different directions in supporting and contesting a claim that must be resolved before a 
reasonable decision can be rendered. This complexity forces a reasoner into a second- 
order set of questions about the comparative relationship among the grounds that are 
positioned in support of or opposition to the claim. Questions arise as to the relative 
weight of reasons that point independently in opposite directions. Even the assumed 
independence of relationships among independently grounded reasons, relating to the 
case, may come into question. 
 The comparison of relative weight among alternative grounds arises most often 
when a single ground does not provide a self-evident context and a reasoner is forced to 
think over what groundings are fitting for the specific choice in question. Such reflection 
is provoked when multiple support is available, conflicting and relatively equal in 
attributed rational force. Thus, whether to rely on personal experience, technical 
reasoning or public trust opens a question in a particular case, where advice conflicts, as 
to what constitutes a legitimate decision. 
 Formally, two kinds of arguments apply: first, why a particular ground should be 
discounted as non-determinative in the decision; second, why a particular ground (or 
combination of grounds) should trump countervailing argumentation. The preference for 
and discounting of alternative grounds for argumentation ideally should be isomorphic, 
but may not be the same. When the preferences for one kind of ground over another 
becomes a rule that is generally applied, then a complex case may be said to have evolved 
through a ‘warrant-establishing’ argument; namely, reasons have been discovered for 
settling a claim in a conflicted context. These warrant-establishing warrants may or may 
not form authoritative precedents for selecting one sort of grounds over another in 
situations of a particular type. 
 Complex case-making of this sort (Type II) occupies a substantial portion of 
everyday argumentation in pluralistic societies, I believe, because modern living is 
suffused with a surplus of reasons for decision, and deliberation requires sorting through 
the multiple sources that aspire to guide, if not determine, the grounds upon which 
rational conduct is deliberated. The routine requirements of complex case-making are 
well illustrated in contrasting the personal field of risk assessment, prudential reasoning, 
as compared to its technical counterpart in science. The question of how to square 
practical and scientific justifications when they evolve as opposing grounds for a decision 
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is a core question of deliberation within the practice of everyday life as well as a site for 
the continuing evolution of controversy. 
 
3. RISK AND LEGITIMATION CONTROVERSY 
 
A traditional view of practical decision-making involves the element of chance or fortune 
in all decisions. Chance is that element of a decision that speaks to a gap between our 
grounded expectations and the actual outcome of an endeavor. The practice of 
deliberative argument assumes that humans are fallible, that they make errors and can 
learn from mistakes by sifting causes and consequences relating choice to activity. The 
element of chance recognizes that in spite of the best reasons, outcomes of actions can 
exceed or disappoint expectations. The intervention of chance into human affairs creates 
a deliberative space where risks can be appraised and evaluated, their consequences 
anticipated and hedged. Type I cases emerge when a deliberation draws upon a single 
field to make a case for taking a chance; Type II cases emerge when multiple fields are in 
play, offering something less than commensurable reasons. 
 
3.1 Traditional views of practical reason acknowledge that chance intervenes into human 
affairs. There are three elements that always accompany portrayals of the goddess Tyche 
(luck for the Greeks) and Fortuna (fortune for the Romans). The goddess is displayed 
holding a cornucopia, representing abundance, standing on a stream or a ball, indicating 
impermanence, and near a rudder, indicating steering or intent. The symbolic field is 
rather unambiguous insofar as the elements of luck enter into human actions in the 
pursuit of fruitful enterprises. Occasionally, fortune is blind, representing that she is 
indifferent to whether the person pursuing an end is deserving or not; at other times, 
fortune is shown by a wheel, cautioning or encouraging reasoners that chance has its up 
and down cycles. The goddess of fortune has been figured as present at great events such 
as battles or at smaller ones, featuring natality. In any event, the relation between risk and 
reason appears to be a staple acknowledgement in the Western tradition. Douglas and 
Wildavsky (1983) argue that all notions of risk are culturally bound. So the limits of 
practical reasoning occasioned by fortune have underwritten the limits of prudential 
reasoning and conduct for millennia. 
 
3.2 Prudential argumentation counsels that fortune visits those who are prepared, who do 
not take incautious risks, who learn from experience, and who draw from general wisdom 
to guide principles of conduct. In everyday argumentation, risks are evaluated from the 
standpoint of personal experience—not from an objective calculus. Experience with risks, 
the intensity of revulsion to a bad outcome, bad publicity and personal preference all 
combine to make up a cautionary field where rules are evolved to guide whether an action 
should be undertaken or a choice made. While preferences may vary, some risks can be 
avoided, others can be framed as not worth taking, and a few may constitute appropriate 
gambits, if losses are not important or could be recouped. A common sense approach to 
risk-taking depends upon practical reasoning to draw from the field of experience a 
connection between cause and effect of an action, thus advising whether or not a risk 
should be taken. Further, our understanding of risk provides a mode of reception for 
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unplanned events that are either windfalls or downfalls, depending on the circumstances. 
When fortune intervenes, little can be done. 
 
3.3 Modernity has changed the reasoning through which risk is appraised. Multiple 
scientific models now underwrite the scientific assessment of risk (Renn, 1992). Science 
makes the appraisal of risk in relation to deliberation quite difficult by introducing 
relatively unique, even counterintuitive, measures of understanding. Several of these will 
be mentioned. 
3.3.1 Latency is the idea that a risk may be encountered at some point and its 
harms only evolve years later. Latency removes the idea that risks are knowable at the 
time they are encountered and that precautions can be taken in a timely fashion. 
3.3.2 Multiple causality is the idea that no one factor may engender a risk, but that 
a combination of unique circumstances may accumulate so as to bring about an 
undesirable set of affairs. Thus, to eliminate one potential cause of a problem (smoking) 
may do nothing for another (genetic predisposition). In many cases, to solve one cause of 
a problem may cause other undesirable risks. 
3.3.3 Threshold reasoning argues that low-level risks may remain without 
consequence for years, only to suddenly accumulate at an unknown point to cross the line 
into a harmful condition. A car may travel for many miles with proper maintenance 
before a crucial part suddenly gives way. In some cases, the direction of activity that 
approaches a harmful threshold is not known. 
3.3.4 Uncertainty is a measure of probability of success or failure of a chosen 
outcome. A general domain of uncertainty, however, says nothing about the individual 
case. When making a decision, say, to have a medical procedure, the range of estimates 
must somehow be translated into individual judgments. Further, uncertainty itself rests on 
the unknown; that is, any scientific probability is only valid in the limited sense that it has 
yet to be disproved by other factors yet to be taken into account and potentially relevant. 
 
3.4 Complex cases evolve where practical reasoning and scientific reasoning are both 
relevant to a decision, but neither is determinative. In many, if not most, cases a particular 
claim may find internally contradictory evidence within the field of personal risk-taking 
and within the field of science too. In such a complex case, the choice of which 
arguments within field X to compare with contrary arguments in the field Y+Z creates the 
potential for thorough-going controversy. At a minimum, if practical and scientific 
reasoning conflict, the choice to ground a risk decision in one field or the other has to be 
accounted for in the specific case. In a case of maximum controversy, the configurations 
of practical, scientific, and political reasons from alternative fields create a complex case 
that balances the argumentative force of fields (and subfields) against one another. The 
legitimation inferences that evolve to subordinate one field to another, discounting 
opposing reasons, create new warrants for argumentation or involve interlocutors in the 
painful process of finding no reasonable guidance to crucial questions. Legitimation 
inferences that set precedents reconfigure the relationships among fields, or the 
contestation within and among fields, by answering the question of justified choice 
among the grounds of reason. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In the beginning of the essay, I promised to redeem Toulmin from the criticism of 
Habermas by showing how the Toulmin model could be adapted to seek out those 
argumentative situations where standards for reasoning essential to a field evolve. This 
can be done, but only if the model is made sensitive to the crucial area of justification that 
constitutes a legitimation inference. The justification of a choice of grounds forces 
reflection upon why a specific backing should count in this case, for this choice, in a 
specific deliberative context. Subjecting the constellating body of authority to scrutiny 
generates a justification for that particular field, as an essential guideline to authorizing a 
warrant as credible, trustworthy, reliable, or believable. Thus, the choice of field 
grounding permits discrimination between relevant grounding and accidental features of 
an enterprise. Tables were turned on Habermas’s own view of argumentation that rests 
reasoning in distinct categories by virtue of independent sources of validity claims. It is 
true, that cases that are rendered complex by multiple reasons may be simplified by 
constitutive stases, as in questions of justice. On the other hand, in deliberation, complex 
cases evolve because personal, technical and political fields may all be relevant but point 
in alternative directions. The arena of risk was explored to illustrate the challenge of 
evolving coherent justifications for combinatory grounds in making important choices in 
modern life. In the end, argumentation theorists are called to study controversies where 
the unsettled relationships among fields and good decisions give rise to arguments over 
the appropriate choice or revision of backing. Such disputes engage us critically in the 
study of legitimation controversies. 
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